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ohn Taylor is well known as a teacher of
macroeconomics, and time and again he has
challenged academics and practitioners alike
to focus attention on how monetary policy should
be formulated and analyzed in terms that are use-
ful and practical.
Until perhaps a decade ago, most academic
discussions of monetary policy were formulated
in terms of the money stock, despite the fact that
central banks invariably implemented monetary
policy decisions through control of money market
interest rates—the federal funds rate in the United
States. Taylor’s work, especially since his widely
cited 1993 Carnegie-Rochester conference article,
has been instrumental in shifting academic discus-
sions closer to what is practically relevant for central
banks. In large part, as a result, a substantial vol-
ume of useful research has been generated on how
the Federal Reserve does or should set the federal
funds rate to achieve and maintain good macro-
economic performance.
In this paper, Taylor goes a step further and
examines the mechanics of open market operations
and the day-to-day determination of the federal
funds rate. The primary objective, once again, is
to bring theory and academic discussion closer to
practice. The standard textbook treatment of the
mechanics of monetary policy implementation sug-
gests that the Federal Reserve may need to perform
some open market operations in order to change
the federal funds rate. It also abstracts from open
market operations when no change in the federal
funds rate is desired. In practice, the Federal Reserve
performs open market operations almost every day.
But contrary to the standard textbook treatment,
an open market operation may not be necessary to
bring about a change in the intended federal funds
rate. Once the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) announces a change in its target, market
reaction moves the federal funds rate from trading
around the old target to trading around the new
one, most often without any action beyond the
announcement, at least not right away.1
I read the paper as an attempt to move towards
a new textbook treatment of open market opera-
tions. It presents a simple model of the supply and
demand for reserve balances. The model empha-
sizes expectations and is capable of explaining how
the Federal Reserve appears to be able to change the
federal funds rate simply by announcing its target
for the rate, that is with “open mouth” operations
instead of open market operations. Of course, de-
tailed models of the supply and demand for reserve
balances and the determination of the federal funds
rate already exist, and Taylor points to some of them.
The objective of this paper, in my view, is not to
break new ground in developing detailed models.
Instead, Taylor tries to distill key features of existing
models in a stylized fashion that can serve as a new
analytical framework for describing the reserves
market. This effort deserves a lot of praise.
The paper begins with a clear summary of
institutional features of the federal funds market
and examines in some detail the daily differences
between the Federal Reserve’s target rate and the
effective rate at which federal funds are actually
traded. There have been a number of changes in
these institutional details over the past few years
and it is of great value to have a summary such as
the one presented by Taylor in one place. 
To better understand the need for a new text-
book treatment of the reserves market, it is useful
to review a couple of pertinent institutional develop-
ments that are only briefly mentioned in the paper.
Reserves serve two important functions for deposi-
tory institutions. The traditional use of reserve hold-
ings by depository institutions is to meet reserve
requirements. Reserve requirements have histori-
cally served a very useful role for implementing
policy and have provided the primary motivation
for earlier textbook treatments of the reserves mar-
ket. Reserve requirements must be met on an aver-
age basis over a two-week maintenance period that
ends every other Wednesday. As a result, they pro-
vide some scope for intertemporal substitution and
adjustment in the daily demand for reserves that
1 I follow Taylor’s usage of the word “target” for the intended or
expected level of the federal funds rate, but note that this usage pro-
vides an accurate description of the Committee’s intent only in the
past few years. The FOMC has made announcements immediately
following a change in its policy stance since February 1994, but has
explicitly announced changes in the federal funds rate expected to
prevail following a policy action only since July 6, 1995. Prior to the
1990s, in particular, identification of the Committee’s policy intent
with a “target’’ for the federal funds rate can be misleading.
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help stabilize the federal funds rate.2 The potential
for this stabilizing role has diminished in the 1990s,
however. During this decade, reductions in reserve
requirements and improvements in technology
that allowed depository institutions to sweep con-
sumer transactions deposits into nonreservable
accounts have resulted in significant reductions in
required reserves. Depository institutions can meet
reserve requirements by holding vault cash and by
maintaining reserve balances at the Federal Reserve.
As a result of the reductions in reserve requirements,
many institutions can now satisfy their reserve
requirements with vault cash alone with no need to
maintain additional balances at the Federal Reserve.
As shown in Figure 1, in the aggregate, the wedge
between required reserves and vault cash that can
be applied against reserve requirements, has dimin-
ished from over $30 billion in 1990 to about $5
billion in 2000.3 As this wedge represents the
amount of required reserve balances that depository
institutions must hold at the Federal Reserve against
reserve requirements, its significant reduction was
one of factors that raised concerns about the poten-
tial for volatility in the reserves market over the
past several years.4
The second, and increasingly more important
function of reserve balances held by depository
institutions in their accounts at Federal Reserve
Banks, is to serve as a buffer against clearing needs.
The Federal Reserve strongly discourages overnight
overdrafts, which can result if an institution faces a
payment order without sufficient funds in its account
to cover it when the order is received. As a precau-
tion against such overdrafts, depository institutions
choose to maintain some overnight balances with
the Federal Reserve even if the balances are not
needed for satisfying reserve requirements. This
consideration was of much less importance in the
past when depository institutions needed to main-
tain greater required reserve balances as those bal-
ances could also serve this precautionary role, when
needed. With required reserve balances diminishing,
however, the role of such precautionary balances
has been amplified.
Maintaining excess reserve balances is costly
to depository institutions since these balances earn
no interest. One way in which depository institu-
tions can reduce this burden, to some degree, is by
establishing so-called required clearing balances
with the Federal Reserve. These provide some com-
pensation in the form of credits that can be used to
2 Carryover provisions that allow some excess reserve holdings in a
maintenance period to be counted against requirements in the follow-
ing (or previous) period ensure that some intertemporal substitution
is possible across maintenance periods as well.
3 Vault cash held in excess of reserve requirements is not counted as
part of aggregate reserves as it cannot be used to meet reserve require-
ments. The applied vault cash series shown in Figure 1 does not
include this surplus. Maintenance period averages are shown.
4 See Clouse and Elmendorf (1997) and Bennett and Hilton (1997).
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pay for Federal Reserve priced services. During the
1990s, depository institutions have negotiated higher
levels of clearing balances and these balances have
become much more important than they had been
in providing a predictable demand for the total
reserves that the Federal Reserve needs to supply
through open market operations to achieve its
federal funds target. As can be seen in Figure 2, as
of 2000, required clearing balances have in fact
surpassed required reserve balances. Despite the
increase in required clearing balances, however,
the total of required reserve balances and required
clearing balances has been falling during the 1990s.
With required balances falling, the Federal Reserve
has been concerned that it may become more diffi-
cult to determine each morning the appropriate
daily quantity of reserves to supply to the market,
especially on days with increased clearing activity
when the precautionary demand for reserve bal-
ances may rise significantly relative to other days.
In light of these concerns, the Federal Reserve has
taken some measures to foster stability and help
reduce volatility in the federal funds market and
this is the reason for some of the recent institutional
changes surveyed in the paper. As confirmed by the
detailed discussion in the paper, the Open Market
Desk (the Desk) has not experienced difficulties
implementing monetary policy in recent years,
suggesting that these steps have been successful.
Taylor presents a disarmingly simple model for
the supply and demand of reserve balances. The
demand for reserve balances is
,
and the supply for reserve balances (Desk reaction
function) is
Here bt is the supply of reserve balances, rt is the
daily effective federal funds rate, and ρt is the target
federal funds rate, all on day t.
Concentrating first on demand, the theoretical
background is provided by work on the manage-
ment of reserves in a stochastic environment.5 To
motivate Taylor’s specification of the demand
function, I prefer to consider separately two impli-
cations for the daily management of reserves that
arise from the two key functions of reserves men-
tioned earlier. 
The first is the desire and ability to arbitrage at
least some of the demand for reserve balances
across days. To meet an average reserve requirement
bb r tt t t =+ − () −− − 11 1 βρ .
br E r tt t t t =− − () + + αγ 1 ε
over a two-week maintenance period, for example,
it does not matter much whether a depository insti-
tution holds the reserves on day t or day t+1. If
the rate on federal funds is expected to fall tomor-
row, demand for reserves will fall today. Thus, the
demand for reserves will be decreasing in the
spread, rt–Etrt+1. The ability to intertemporally
substitute reserve holdings across time is limited,
of course, and consequently the elasticity of demand
with respect to this spread between the rate at t
and the expected rate at t+1 cannot be infinite.
This reasoning implies that the parameter α in the
demand equation is finite, as Taylor posits. The same
motivation suggests that this elasticity should also
be present in another margin available to deposi-
tory institutions for reserve management, namely
discount window borrowing. When reserve holdings
are expensive relative to their expected cost in sub-
sequent days, depository institutions will be more
willing to resort to the discount window when they
face a shortfall in their reserve positions. Indeed,
Hanes (2000) presents convincing empirical evi-
dence for this mechanism, which lends support on
this aspect of Taylor’s simple demand specification. 
The second motive relevant for the daily
demand equation is the precautionary motive to
hold reserves for clearing needs—particularly
towards the end of the day after the closing of the
FedWire. Since excess reserve holdings reduce the
probability of costly overnight overdrafts, their
demand is akin to the demand for insurance, with
the usual implication that more insurance will be
purchased when its price is relatively lower. This
suggests that, other things equal, the precautionary
demand for reserves is somewhat inversely related
to the cost of holding reserves, that is, today’s rate, rt.
Combined, the two motives suggest a demand
equation: 
with θ,δ>0. Trivially, this collapses to Taylor’s
equation and also satisfies his imposed restriction
that the partial elasticity with respect to today’s
rate, α=θ+δ, is somewhat greater that the partial
elasticity with respect to the expectation of tomor-
row’s rate, αγ=θ.
My reaction to the demand function as a text-
br E r r tt t t t t =− − () −+ − θδ 1 ε ,
5 This is based on the intuition from the work Taylor reviews, though
similar features are also present in other recent work, such as Bartolini,
Bertola, and Prati (2000), Clouse and Dow (2000), and Hanes (2000).
The grandparent of research on reserve management in a stochastic
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book treatment of the demand for reserves is very
positive. It is elegant. It nicely captures the element
that appears important for understanding “open
mouth” operations—namely, the expectation of
tomorrow’s rate. And it abstracts from a number of
elements that, although they may be important, are
not essential for understanding the market at an
elementary level.
I am afraid I cannot be as positive for the second
key equation in Taylor’s model, regarding the supply
of reserves. Taylor models the Desk’s operations
as a mechanical reaction function that relies exclu-
sively on the previous day’s miss of the effective
federal funds rate from the Desk’s target rate to guide
open market operations in the morning of the cur-
rent day. As motivation, Taylor suggests that effective
implementation of monetary policy in this model
requires credibility that the Desk will do its best to
achieve the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate.
This credibility, Taylor argues, can be achieved if the
Desk follows a simple mechanical reaction function
such as the one he posits. 
To be clear, I agree with Taylor’s motivation.
Effective implementation of monetary policy, when
the daily demand for reserves is sensitive to expec-
tations regarding the federal funds rate on subse-
quent days, requires a credible commitment that the
Desk will do its best to achieve the FOMC’s target
rate for federal funds, thereby stabilizing expecta-
tions for the federal funds rate on subsequent days.
However, I do not find the reaction function Taylor
posits consistent with this motivation. Taylor’s
mechanical reaction function is far from the best
way to achieve the Desk’s objective. It is also a rather
poor description of what the Desk actually does.
To evaluate Taylor’s Trading Desk reaction
function as a description of Desk operations and
contrast it with possible alternatives, it is useful to
examine how the members of the Markets Group
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the peo-
ple behind the Desk) have described the Desk’s
operations in the recent past. A useful source for
this is the annual report of open market operations
prepared by the Markets Group. For example, the
second paragraph on the first page of the report for
1997 states6: 
The Committee’s directives instruct the
Trading Desk to maintain the federal funds
rate on average around a specified level.
Open market operations are used to provide
a level of nonborrowed reserves that will
allow the federal funds market to clear at the
indicated level. Each day, the Desk aims to
keep the rate as close to the targeted level
as possible with a minimum of volatility.
But in deciding each day’s operations, the
Desk also considers how its flexibility for
arranging operations in upcoming days
might be affected by that day’s course of
action as well as how the behavior of the
funds rate that day might influence rates in
subsequent days.
In stark contrast to the emphasis on outcomes
during the previous day in Taylor’s Trading Desk
reaction function, this description points towards a
forward looking approach to Desk operations and
indicates that in selecting its early morning open
market operation the Desk “each day…aims to keep
the rate as close to the targeted level as possible
with a minimum of volatility” (emphasis added).
The description also suggests alternatives to Taylor’s
Trading Desk reaction function that could arguably
offer better characterizations of the Desk’s opera-
tions. For instance, one could simply posit that the
Desk sets the supply of reserves each morning so
that the effective rate during the day is expected to
be as close as possible to the target rate. Letting Etm
reflect the expectation operator with information
available in early morning of day t, tm, this suggests
a supply function implicitly determined by the
expectation 
and market clearing conditions. This characteriza-
tion offers considerable and realistic flexibility. For
instance, it recognizes that each morning the Desk
takes account of anticipated variations in the daily
demand and supply of reserves from normal pat-
terns and attempts to offset known shocks that may
be expected to influence the market during the day.7
To appreciate the Desk’s task and its approach
in performing daily operations, it is instructive to
Er tt t mm =ρ
6 Similar paragraphs appear in the reports for 1998 and 1999 as well.
7 On the other hand, this is also somewhat simplistic as it ignores the
influence of the choice of operations during one day on the degree of
success with which the Desk could achieve its target on subsequent
days—a consideration suggested in the last sentence of the quoted
paragraph. One implication alluded to in this sentence is that the Desk
might opt for an operation consistent with an expected deviation of
the federal funds rate from its target during a day if doing so could
be expected to significantly reduce the likely volatility of the federal
funds rate on subsequent days. (Footnote 11 offers one example where
such considerations may have been relevant in early 2000.)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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revisit Taylor’s detailed analysis of recent policy
changes. The analysis suggests that the Desk has
been quite successful in implementing changes in
the federal funds rate in the recent past. Federal
funds have traded close to the new rate virtually
immediately following a change in policy. And trad-
ing has tended to closely reflect the old rate before
a change in policy.
One feature not emphasized in the paper,
which I believe is important for the analysis, is that
this has been the case even though a policy move
may have been expected with high probability by
market participants. For example, it is not the case
if market participants expect a tightening on, say,
Tuesday, that this tightening is reflected in trading
a week earlier. This would be inconsistent with the
Desk’s objectives and Desk operations would
actively seek to counteract it.8
To see this, in Figure 3 I reproduced the effective
and target rates shown in Taylor’s paper for the last
three policy moves: February 2, March 21, and May
16, 2000.9 On these series I superimposed the rate
on the federal funds futures contract for February,
April, and June, respectively. These months corre-
spond, as closely as possible but obviously not
perfectly, to the month following the FOMC meet-
ing at which each tightening was decided but pre-
ceding the subsequent FOMC meeting. For each
move, the figure shows four weeks of business-
daily data centered around the two-week reserve
maintenance period during which the policy move
occurred. (The two vertical lines in each panel indi-
cate maintenance-period ending Wednesdays.)
Consider first the March 21, 2000, policy move
shown in the middle panel. The federal funds
future contract for April 2000 can be viewed as a
bet on the average level of the federal funds rate
that the market expected to prevail during April
2000. But since no FOMC meeting was scheduled
during April, it would be reasonable to expect that
the FOMC’s target rate during April would be the
one decided during the March meeting. Thus, the
rate implied in the April contract on any given day
prior to the March meeting reflected market expec-
tations of the FOMC decision at that meeting.
As can be seen, the April contract was consis-
tently trading around 6 percent for weeks before
the March meeting and on this occasion correctly
anticipated the move to a 6 percent target rate that
was decided at the meeting. At the same time, the
effective rate on federal funds remained around
5.75 percent and one could not possibly detect the
market’s near certain expectation of the policy
change in that rate prior to the policy move. 
Likewise, with the May policy move (lower panel),
trading of the June 2000 futures contract suggested
that the 50 basis points increase in the target rate
was widely anticipated before it materialized,
though a small probability that the increase could be
only 25 basis points appears to have been priced in
the contract until just prior to the meeting.10
Similarly, with the February policy move (top
panel), the futures contract for February antici-
pated that a tightening would likely take place on
February 2. The contract traded consistently some-
what above 5.75 percent prior to the meeting, sug-
gesting that although the 25 basis points tightening
that took place was considered the most likely
decision, a small probability of a 50 basis points
tightening was also priced in the contract.11
Daily tracking of the FOMC’s target rate, during
a maintenance period when a change in the target
is anticipated, poses special challenges for Desk
operations as efforts by depository institutions to
8 In general, the behavior of the federal funds rate during days preced-
ing an FOMC meeting primarily reflects the Desk’s constant efforts
to track its target and is a rather poor indicator of market beliefs
regarding the likelihood of a policy change at the meeting. One con-
sequence of this is that Granger causality tests, such as those reported
in Table 2 of the paper, are not particularly informative.
9 These were the first three meetings of 2000. The federal funds rate
target was left unchanged following the fourth meeting of the year,
which took place June 27-28.
10 The next policy decision was scheduled for June 28 (the second day
of the June 27-28 FOMC meeting). As a result, the June contract could
be roughly interpreted as a weighted average of the May decision
(28/30 of the contract) and the June decision (2/30 of the contract).
The fact that the contract for June traded a bit above 6.5 percent
following the May meeting reflected the influence of expectations
of another possible tightening move at the end of June.
11 Unlike in March and May, the effective federal funds rate prior to the
February 2 tightening, on Monday, January 31 and Tuesday, February 1,
was significantly higher than the target and closer to the expected
rate following the policy action. As is clear from the data, however,
this did not reflect a major change in expectations regarding the
tightening from the previous Friday, January 28. One explanation of
the higher rates on January 31 and February 1 is larger than expected
increases in the demand for reserves associated with the greater clear-
ing needs often seen on the first and last day of a month. Another
(and complementary) explanation is that, although the Desk may
have correctly perceived the increase in demand during those days,
it may have been reluctant to fully counteract it because doing so
might have raised the volatility of the market on subsequent days.
(This is the possibility raised in footnote 7). Such a concern may arise
when the Desk perceives that adding the level of reserves required to
keep the rate close to its target early in a maintenance period may
significantly reduce the need for reserve balances later during the
same period. The combination of end-of-month and expected tighten-
ing pressures just prior to the February 2 move could have justified
such a concern on this occasion.54 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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economize their cost of maintaining average reserve
balances during the period tend to distort the nor-
mal daily intra-period pattern of reserve demand.
Obviously, assessment of such relative changes in
intra-period demand can be quite difficult and likely
not very accurate. Viewed in this light, the apparent
success of the Desk in tracking the FOMC’s target
relatively closely around the three anticipated tight-
enings, shown in Figure 3, offers a striking illustra-
tion of the Desk’s credibility and its ability to adjust
reserves on a daily basis to achieve its objective.
Similar success would have been unlikely had
the Desk implemented policy by mechanically
reacting to the previous day’s miss of the effective
federal funds rate from the Desk’s target. Of course,
to the extent the previous day’s miss, (rt–1–ρt–1), is
an important summary statistic of stochastic supply
and demand conditions that might influence the
market on day t, it might be useful for determining
the appropriate open market operation during day
t. The previous day’s miss could sometimes sum-
marize information regarding demand and supply
shocks that influenced the market during day t–1,
and some of these shocks might persist during day t.
In this sense, the previous day’s miss is part of the
information set the Desk employs in determining
its operation during day t. As with any other variable
that might provide useful information about market
conditions, a response to this miss could be included
in a mechanical reaction function for the Desk. The
Figure 3
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difficulty is that not all variables are always equally
useful as indicators. Statistical relationships change
over time and so do our perceptions about such
relationships and their usefulness for the future.
Consequently it is practically impossible for a simple
mechanical reaction function to reasonably capture
the appropriate reaction at all times. And suggesting
that the Desk follow a specific simple backward-
looking rule at all times could quickly prove inade-
quate as a guide. 
There are parallels to this and the analysis of
how the FOMC should set its target for the federal
funds rate to achieve its objectives of price stabil-
ity and maximum sustainable growth over time
(although the Committee’s problem is arguably
much more complex). The FOMC could follow a
simple rule and adjust the interest rate mechanically
to past inflation, for example. When inflation picks
up, the rate could be raised and vice versa. This
strategy could achieve price stability and reason-
ably stable growth on average, but it is unnecessar-
ily crude and would leave scope for improvement.
Allowing for judgment and flexibility in policy
decisions is one approach. Alternatively, one could
try to suggest an “improved” policy rule, specify
that the FOMC follow a rule that mechanically reacts
to the output gap or its close cousin, the unemploy-
ment gap, in addition to inflation. Indeed, as Taylor
points out in footnote 12 of his paper, some modern
research has emphasized that such a response may
Figure 4































be optimal. Perhaps the best-known example of
such a rule is the one Taylor proposed in his 1993
Carnegie-Rochester conference article. As Taylor
showed at the time, this rule described policy in
the late 1980s and early 1990s rather well. This
period was one in which monetary policy is gener-
ally believed to have been successful, so one could
conclude that this rule would have provided reason-
able guidance to monetary policy during that time.
But there is no guarantee that the same rule would
have provided good advice in other settings. Indeed,
as shown in Orphanides (2000), the very same rule
also appears to describe monetary policy during
the early 1970s, a period during which monetary
policy is generally considered to have been much
less successful—if not outright disastrous.
Since this conference is in honor of Darryl
Francis, I think it is most appropriate to illustrate
what can go wrong with an example from a fascinat-
ing FOMC meeting in which he participated as a
voting member, on August 18, 1970. To set the stage,
recall that a recession earlier that year had shifted
policy towards ease, while inflation, which had
risen in the previous two years, remained a serious
concern. This was the first of the “stagflation” years
in the United States. By the August FOMC meeting,
available data indicated a small increase in second
quarter gross national product (GNP), suggesting the
economy was turning around. However, the unem-
ployment rate had risen to nearly 5 percent and
Federal Reserve staff projected a further increase,
well above the widely held at the time 4 percent
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. Simi-
larly, available estimates of the output gap showed
a continued deterioration. And it appeared quite
reasonable to expect an improvement to the infla-
tionary problem.12 Based on this information,
application of the Taylor rule would have suggested
that a further policy easing was appropriate. Indeed
a policy easing was adopted at the meeting and
policy remained easy (and broadly consistent with
the Taylor rule) for several quarters.
Darryl Francis dissented at this meeting. In his
view, easing policy further would have been a mis-
take. His words, as reflected in the Memorandum
of Discussion (1970) for the meeting, would prove
prophetic:
Mr Francis said that much of the current
unemployment was structural and could not
be obviated except temporarily and with
adverse price effects by stimulation of total
spending. In view of the strong inflationary
actions, quick results in obtaining relatively
stable prices and a reduction of transitional
unemployment should not be expected.
Attempts directed at rapid cures or fine
tuning had usually caused more serious
problems later on.
Mechanical reliance and response to past data
always runs the risk of providing misleading advice
at times, however well intentioned the design of a
simple rule may be. For Desk operations, it is un-
necessarily crude to adopt such a mechanical rule
for determining daily open market operations each
morning. So in my view, there is scope for improve-
ment in the half of Taylor’s model that deals with
the daily supply of reserves. But the other half of the
model could hardly be more elegant as a description
of the daily demand for reserves. Overall, this is a
very valuable paper to read.
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